Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat by Bratton, William W
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
8-22-2016 
Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of 
Threat 
William W. Bratton 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Corporate Finance Commons, Law and Economics 
Commons, and the Strategic Management Policy Commons 
Repository Citation 
Bratton, William W., "Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat" (2016). Faculty 
Scholarship at Penn Law. 1667. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1667 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
1 
 
Hedge Fund Activism, Poison Pills, and the Jurisprudence of Threat 
William W. Bratton 
Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law and Co-Director, Institute for Law & Economics 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews the single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has 
come to bear on management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge—the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision to sustain a low-threshold poison pill deployed against 
an activist in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht.  The decision implicated an important policy 
question: whether a twentieth century doctrine keyed to hostile takeovers and control transfers 
appropriately can be brought to bear in a twenty-first century governance context in which the 
challenger eschews control transfer and instead makes aggressive use of the shareholder 
franchise.  Resolution of the question entails evaluation of the gravity of two sets of threats, one 
at the doctrinal level and the other at the policy level.  The doctrinal threats are exterior threats 
to corporate policy and effectiveness on which managers justify defensive tactics under Unocal 
v. Mesa Petroleum Co.  Because some threats have greater justificatory salience under Unocal 
than do others, a question arises as to the nature and characterization of the threats allegedly 
held out by activist intervention.  The policy threats implicate the new balance of power between 
managers and shareholders.  The chapter appraises the threats. As regards Unocal, it 
demonstrates a serious problem of fit.  The chapter goes on to conduct a thought experiment that 
reshapes and extends Unocal so that it does provide a robust basis for sustaining management 
defense against activist hedge funds, even shielding poison pills with 5 percent triggers.  The 
extension amounts to radical reformulation of the conceptual framework of corporate law, 
thereby posing the policy threat.  But the policy threat, on examination, proves uncompelling, 
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today’s corporate managers being disinclined to traverse shareholder preferences by 
promulgating standing poison pills.  Given that, the chapter asks whether 5 percent poison pills 
could hold out policy benefits in the form of company-by-company shareholder-manager 
engagement on the question of suitability for activist intervention.   
INTRODUCTION 
 Hedge fund activism is to corporate law’s early twenty-first century what the hostile 
takeover was to its late twentieth century.  Like the hostile takeover, activism threatens 
incumbent managers and disrupts their business plans by successfully appealing to the 
shareholders’ interest in immediate returns.  Like the hostile takeover, activism occupies center 
stage in corporate law policy discussions, posing a choice between short-term gain and long-term 
investment.  But there is a glaring point of distinction.  Unlike the hostile takeover, activism has 
precipitated no significant changes in corporate law.  Where the hostile takeover triggered 
structural changes in state corporate codes and the federal securities laws along with a root and 
branch reconfiguration of fiduciary duty, hedge fund activism largely leaves corporate law where 
it found it.   The activists manage to play hostilely without bumping up against the defensive 
barriers erected in the late twentieth century transformation of corporate law because they avoid 
attempting to take control.   At the same time, law reform initiatives designed to constrain the 
new mode of hostile intervention have failed to pick up traction.   
 There is but a single high profile case in which twentieth century antitakeover law has 
come to bear on a management defense against a twenty-first century activist challenge—the 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht,1 better known as “the 
Sotheby’s case.”  The board of directors of a target corporation, Sotheby’s, lobbed a poison pill 
in the path of one of the more aggressive hedge funds, Third Point LLC, and its sharp-elbowed 
chief, Daniel Loeb.  The pill had a “low threshold” feature, capping a hostile challenger’s block 
at 10 percent of outstanding shares rather at the traditional 20 percent.  It thereby disabled Third 
Point from enhancing its vote total in a short-slate proxy contest through additional purchases of 
target shares. The Chancery Court nonetheless sustained the pill under Unocal v. Mesa 
                                                          
1 2014 WL 1922029 (Del. Ch.) 
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Petroleum Co.2  The decision implicated an important policy question: whether a twentieth 
century doctrine keyed to hostile takeovers and control transfers appropriately can be brought to 
bear in a twenty-first century governance context in which the challenger eschews control 
transfer and instead makes aggressive use of the shareholder franchise.   
 Resolution of the issue question entails evaluation of the gravity of two sets of threats, 
one at the doctrinal level and the other at the policy level.  The doctrinal threats are exterior 
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness on which managers justify defensive tactics under 
Unocal.   Because some threats have greater justificatory salience under Unocal than do others, a 
question arises as to the nature and characterization of the threats allegedly held out by activist 
intervention.  The policy threats implicate the new balance of power between managers and 
shareholders.  Hedge fund activism has operated as a catalyst that enables dispersed shareholders 
to surmount collective action problems so as to register preferences regarding corporate business 
plans in connection with voting on competing candidates for board seats.   To the extent that 
managers wielding low-threshold poison pills disable activist challenges, the power balance 
could shift back in their favor with potentially negative agency cost consequences.  
 This chapter appraises the threats. As regards Unocal, it demonstrates a serious problem 
of fit.  The most potent Unocal threats are those involving coercion of dispersed shareholders in 
connection with hostile tender offers or expropriation from dispersed shareholders by controlling 
blockholders.  The threats, originally identified on 1980s control transfer fact patterns, show up 
only tangentially on the new fact patterns.  To the extent that Unocal doctrine relies on the old 
threats in sustaining poison pills deployed against today’s activists, it ends up as more of a 
formal rubber stamp than a substantive fiduciary inquiry.   
The Sotheby’s opinion, although for the most part staying inside of the inherited 
framework of Unocal doctrine, does take a tentative step into the twenty-first century, suggesting 
that activists hold out a threat of “disproportionate influence,” but without filling in any 
particulars about the influence’s nature and negative effect.   This chapter posits the missing 
details, conducting a thought experiment that reshapes and extends Unocal so that it provides a 
robust basis for sustaining management defense against activist hedge funds, even shielding 
                                                          
2 493 A2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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poison pills with 5 percent triggers.  The extension is radical.  Up to now, Unocal has facilitated 
management actions that protect dispersed shareholders from being railroaded into selling the 
company for too little.  Under the extension, Unocal would justify management actions that 
protect shareholders from the consequences of their own collective actions in casting uncoerced 
ballots at director elections.  Many, perhaps most observers, would view the extension as a 
perversion of the governance system’s heretofore jealous protection of the shareholder franchise 
to elect directors.     
The chapter’s refitted version of Unocal sharply poses the policy threat. Most observers 
would find the prospect of an easily-justified 5 percent poison pill threatening indeed, projecting 
that it would inhibit activist intervention and thereby damage the corporate governance system.   
But the projection of harm rings hollow in the present posture of shareholder-manager politics.  
Even if structural changes inhibiting activism would in fact result in economic injury, no 
significant inhibition is likely to follow from judicial sanction of a 5 percent pill.  A low-
threshold pill deters activist block formation only to the extent that it is put in in place advance of 
the activist’s appearance.  These days very few managers dare to promulgate such “standing” 
pills.  So powerful have shareholders become that in today’s managerial cost-benefit calculus, 
the detriments of incurring the shareholders’ wrath by traversing their governance preferences 
regarding charters and bylaws now outweigh a poison pill’s insulating benefits.    
Given that, it is worth asking whether 5 percent poison pills could out policy benefits.  
The policy stakes are traversed in a debate in which activism is associated with value-destructive 
short termism.  The debate’s participants argue back and forth based on assumed across-the-
board tendencies.  But questions about short-term value sacrifices cannot be resolved on an 
aggregate basis.  It depends on the company.  Some are appropriate targets for activist 
intervention, while others are not.  This chapter suggests that company-by-company dialogue on 
the point would be good thing, exploring the possibility that a 5 percent standing pill could 
trigger useful informational back and between managers and institutional investors without 
simultaneously over-deterring activist intervention.   
Part I assays the Sotheby’s case.  Part II situates Unocal threat doctrine in the context of 
hedge fund activism, showing a need for reformulation.  Part III reformulates Unocal, positing a 
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theory supporting a poison pill with a 5 percent trigger.  Part IV considers this low threshold 
pill’s policy implications in the new world of empowered shareholders.      
 
I. THE SOTHEBY’S CASE 
Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht denied a motion to enjoin deployment of a poison pill 
carefully tailored to target an activist hedge fund.  The pill featured a two-tier trigger that sorted 
between passive and active blockholders.3  Blockholders whose passive intentions were verified 
by a disclosure statement filed under a form 13G were capped at 20 percent of the stock while an 
activist with aspirations to make changes at the company and so filing a form 13D under rule 
13d-1 faced a lower 10 cap on its block.4 The drafting otherwise was scrupulous.  The pill’s 
duration was limited to a year.  All cash, all shares tender offers were excepted,5 showing that 
the board addressed only challenges in the activist hedge fund mode and did not seek to block a 
hostile control transfer on procedurally fair terms.   Nor, as tends to be the case these days, was it 
a “standing” pill, put in place well in advance of a hedge fund challenge on a one-size-fits-all 
basis.  It was instead promulgated by the target board after the Third Point’s campaign had been 
proceeding for months,6 facilitating a situation specific justification keyed threats particular to 
Third Point.   
The activist campaign was high-powered.  At its commencement, a three fund “wolf 
pack” demanded changes in Sotheby’s business plan and governance arrangements, a demand 
backed up by a credible threat to launch a proxy fight for board seats.  Third Point, which 
eventually accumulated 9.6 percent of the company’s outstanding shares, took the lead, with 
Mercato (6.6 percent) and Trian (less than 5 percent) in tow.  Thus did the Sotheby’s board 
already face a combined hostile block holding 20 percent as it promulgated its poison pill.  The 
pill’s bite lay in its containment of further stock acquisitions by Third Point, a bar that crimped 
the fund’s freedom of action to add to its vote total by purchasing more shares in heat of a close 
proxy contest. 
                                                          
3 The poison in a poison pill is two-for-one dilution of the challenger’s stock block.  It follows that challengers avoid 
traversing the triggers, instead turning to the courts to ask for invalidation.    
4 Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, 2014 WL 1922029, at 9 (Del. Ch.) 
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
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The litigation laid two new situations at the door of Delaware’s poison pill jurisprudence.  
First, the 10 percent trigger amounted to a step-up in defensive intensity, and, while not 
unprecedented in practice, had not been considered by a court.   Poison pill drafters historically7 
had set the trigger applied to block accumulations at 20 percent, the rule-of-thumb magnitude 
thought to import sufficient influence to justify the attribution of “control block.”8  Second, 
never before had a hedge fund activist come to the Delaware Chancery Court attacking a pill 
deployed to inhibit a proxy contest.9  
Even so, law sufficient to sustain the pill already was largely in place.   Delaware parses 
review of defensive tactics into two categories.  Unocal holds out the general rule, invalidating 
“preclusive” and “coercive” defenses on a per se basis, while subjecting all other management 
defenses to proportionality review, under which the measure must be reasonable in view of the 
threat posed.10  A separate line of cases, grounded in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,11 
applies to management actions primarily intended to interfere with or impede exercise of the 
shareholder franchise.  These require a “compelling” justification, a standard unlikely to be met.  
Unsurprisingly, Third Point argued that a poison pill drafted with a discriminatory 10 percent 
trigger with a view to inhibit activist vote accumulation interfered with the franchise within 
                                                          
7 The pill in the original case, Moran v. Household International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), included a 20 
percent block acquisition trigger.  Lower thresholds did not come into use until recent years. 
8 A 5 percent trigger was sustained in Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010), but the case 
was easily distinguished.  The trigger in question addressed a tax rule that removed loss carryforwards in the event 
of the appearance of a 5 percent block holders.  Give the tax angle, the court had no trouble sustaining the low-
threshold pill by reference to the welfare of the shareholders as a group. 
9 Several Delaware cases did cast doubt on the operation of a similar defensive device in the context of hedge fund 
activism—the “poison puts” contained in bond and loan contracts.  Poison puts are drafted in the same mold as 
poison pills, setting out triggers keyed to a list of control changes and control challenges.  When the trigger goes off, 
holders of the securities covered by the debt contract receive a right to put the securities back to issuer at face value.  
Depending on the drafting, activist challenges holding out acquisition of a majority of board seats can either trigger 
the pill or result in the defending board receiving discretion to trigger the pill.  If the debt securities trading at a 
discount to face value, exercise of the put injures the corporation by transferring value to the debt holders.  A cash 
management disability can result even in the absence of a discount.  The cases in turn disable the put’s operation.  
See Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch.2013).  The cases are easily distinguished.  In a poison 
put case, the defensive device financially injures the company and thus its shareholders as a group for the benefit of 
the bondholders and the defending managers.  In a poison pill case, the device injures the shareholders only by 
inference.  It makes an activist challenge more expensive and difficult.  But the deterrent effect injures the 
shareholders generally only to the extent that activism benefits them.  Meanwhile, in a case like Sotheby’s, the 
protected shareholders remain free to vote in favor of the activist slate at the annual meeting, arguably eliminating 
any direct threat of injury.  
10  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del.1995). 
11 564 A. 2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).   
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Blasius.12   But the cases already had restricted Blasius scrutiny to a small set of situations in 
which the defensive move has the effect of altogether precluding exercise of the franchise. 13  So 
long as the defense left the contestant free to put its candidates or proposition to the shareholders 
for an “effective” vote, the defense’s effect of raising the bar to victory did not amount to 
“interference” within Blasius. 14  And nothing was preventing Third Point from conducting its 
proxy contest.  
Meanwhile, the Unocal cases etched a profile of a threatening blockholder, the “creeping 
control” acquirer.15  The “creeping” lies in the acquirer’s gradual accumulation of a control block 
through open market stock purchases.  By the time such a holder gets to 51 percent, the premium 
realizable in respect of a future control transfer appends to its block of stock rather than to the 
corporate entity and the shareholders as a group.  The blockholder, who has not paid the selling 
shareholders a pro rata portion of control value in the course of its open market purchase 
program, effectively converts the premium potentially realized for the benefit of the shareholders 
as a group upon a sale of the whole.   Such a block need not even amount to a majority stake, for 
the value of control begins to attach once the stake passes the 20 percent threshold.  Thus do both 
the European Union and the United Kingdom require an accumulating blockholder to make an 
offer to buy 100 percent of the company’s stock upon passing a 30 percent threshold.16    Under 
the Unocal cases, a proxy challenger seeking less than a majority of board seats (a “short slate”) 
and disavowing interest in control acquisition is nevertheless susceptible to a creeping control 
characterization to the extent the challenger can be shown to have either (1) made control 
acquisitions in the past implicating unequal outcomes, or (2) made statements projecting a 
possible control transfer at the target, including a third-party merger.17  Creeping control is thus a 
capacious category of threat. 
                                                          
12 2014 WL 1922029, at 14-15. 
13 See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 91 (Del.1992); Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. 
Ch. 2010), aff’d a5 A.3d 2318 (Del. 2011). 
14 See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1130 (Del. 2003). 
15 2014 WL 1922029, at 16-18; Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 350-51, 359-60 (Del. Ch. 
2010), aff’d 5 A.3d 2318 (Del. 2011). 
16 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Takeover Bids, art 5 sec 
1-4; UK Takeover Code Rules 9.1, 9.5. 
17 Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 348-350 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d 5 A.3d 2318 (Del. 
2011). 
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Third Point and its principal, Daniel Loeb, perfectly fit the profile.  As regarded past 
activity, they had made acquisition bids for targets and negotiated defensive block repurchases 
by targets.18  As regarded present statements, Loeb had both discussed the possibility of pushing 
Sotheby’s into a private equity buyout and projected that he would take operational control of the 
company and re-orient its operations.19  Potential damage to the business also was shown: 
Loeb’s aggressive public statements were disturbing customer relationships in a heavily 
relational line of business.20   It is hard to imagine an actor more ill-suited to the role of plaintiff 
in a test case. 
The Chancery Court, per Vice-Chancellor Parsons, nonetheless characterized the case as 
close.  The Court inspected the pill as of two different dates, first upon promulgation prior to the 
commencement of the proxy contest, and second, at a later date in the midst of the solicitation 
process.  The second look had been triggered by Third Point, which made a formal request to the 
Sotheby’s board to waive the 10 percent threshold so as to permit it to buy up to 20 percent.21  
The Court sustained creeping control as a validating threat only as of the earlier date.  In the 
Court’s characterization, the promulgating board had faced a 20 percent wolf pack the intentions 
of which could have included either of control acquisition or a third party control transfer.22  As 
of the later date, however, the Court held that a creeping control threat no longer was plausible.  
By then it was clear that the hostile attack devolved on a proxy contest for a few board seats with 
no control transfer in the offing.23  Moreover, one of the Sotheby’s directors, when asked on 
deposition what had motivated the board to refuse to waive the pill, said that minimizing the 
challenger’s vote total was the prevailing concern.24  Under Unocal, a primary motivation to 
retain one’s position leads to prompt invalidation,25 and it is one of the defending counsel’s 
primary jobs to make sure that the board justifies its actions exclusively in terms of shareholder 
injury prevention.  Such slips can be fatal.  
                                                          
18 2014 WL 1922029, at 5. 
19 Id. at 4. 
20 Id. at 7, 11. 
21 Id. at 20. 
22 Id. at 17-19. 
23 It bears noting that one of the wolf pack members, Trian, had sold down its block a month after the board adopted 
the pill. See Carmen X.W. Lua, Unpacking Wolf Packs, 125 Yale L.J. 773, 780 (2016). 
24  2014 WL 1922029, at 13. 
25 493 A.2d at 19 (plaintiffs must show a reasonable probability of demonstrating that the Board acted with 
“animus” or an “entrenchment motive”). 
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But the Sotheby’s board squeaked through and Third Point’s motion to enjoin the pill was 
denied for failure to make the requisite showing of a likelihood of success on the merits.26  The 
Chancery Court devised two additional, albeit weaker, threat characterizations applicable on the 
later date.  The first, “negative control,” was relied upon in as a basis for refusing the injunction: 
even though Third Point could not be said to aspire to hold a control block, further acquisitions 
could import negative voting salience—a number of shares sufficient to veto a proposition 
subject to a super-majority vote.27  The Court added that even if Third Point did not have enough 
shares to wield a unilateral negative block, moving up toward 20 percent could give it 
“disproportionate control and influence over major corporate decisions.” 28 There was no further 
explication as to what that meant.   
Third Point lost the battle but not the war.  Soon after the Court refused the injunction, 
preliminary vote counts showed that Third Point was poised to win the proxy contest.  The 
Sotheby’s board cut its losses and settled, admitting Loeb and two of his nominees into the 
boardroom.29   
Third Point also might have won the battle against the poison pill had the Court analyzed 
the situation slightly differently as of the second look.  Previous cases had focused on creeping 
control. Once creeping control was off the table, alternative decisional possibilities opened up, 
most importantly the option of giving decisive weight to the evidence concerning the motivation 
of the defending board.  To the extent the Sotheby’s directors were focused on the impending 
vote count, they arguably no longer lay in the zone of Unocal threat protection at all.  It would 
have been a suitably narrow ground of decision.  Alternatively, the Court might have travelled 
the harder road and dismissed the secondary threats, negative control and disproportionate 
influence, as lacking in gravity.   
But it didn’t, leaving us with two questions.  The first goes to the accuracy of the 
creeping control characterization in the activist context.  The second question, which follows in 
                                                          
26 2014 WL 1922029. at 21. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 22. 
29 S. Michael J. de la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s Yields to Hedge Fund Mogul and Allies, N.Y. 
Times, May 5, 2014 available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/sothebys-and-loeb-end-fight-over-
board/?_r=0. 
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the wake of a negative answer to the first, is whether activism otherwise holds out threats, 
however characterized, cognizable in Unocal contexts. 
 
II. HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM AND CORPORATE CONTROL 
 This Part reconsiders Unocal and the creeping control threat in activist contexts.    
Stewart Gillen and Laura Starks have accurately defined shareholder activists as “investors, who 
dissatisfied with some aspect of the company’s management or operations, try to bring about 
change within the company without a change in control.”30   One accordingly must massage the 
facts a little in order to support a creeping control characterization.  Two factors have come to 
the fore, the wolf pack engagement pattern and the activists’ interest in pushing their targets into 
third-party mergers.  But the creeping control characterization remains problematic even given 
selective underscoring.  There are three reasons: (1) individual hedge funds almost never 
accumulate 20 percent; (2) wolf packs are not ubiquitous and tend to accumulate less than 20 
percent, and (3) the mergers that do result in a minority of cases and hold out no cognizable harm 
to shareholders.  Control transfer by merger is a salient, but ancillary possibility in the wake of 
activist intervention.  When intervention does prompt a control transfer, the hedge fund is very, 
very unlikely to be acquiring party and the proceeds of sale are shared pro rata with the 
shareholders as a group. It follows that the articulated basis for applying Unocal in activist 
contexts is lacks substantial support in the practice.    
A. Share Accumulation 
 1.  Standalone funds. 
Hedge funds, even lead hedge funds, do not build control blocks.  Only a handful of 
activist positions ever approach 20 percent.  Boyson and Mooradian found a mean activist block 
holding of 8.8 percent upon initial 13d-1 filing and a maximum accumulation mean holding of 
12.4 percent.31  Other studies offer a more granular picture.   Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 
                                                          
30 Stewart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. Applied 
Corp. Fin. 55 (2007). 
31 Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Experienced Hedge Fund Activists, working paper,  April 3, 2012 
available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1787649.   
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show, at the 75th percentile, an initial holding of 8.8 percent and a maximum holding of 13 
percent.  At the 95th percentile, they report an initial holding of 19.8 percent and a maximum 
holding of 25 percent.32  More recently, Gantchev reports an initial filing maximum of 16 
percent at the 95th percentile and a maximum holding of 18 percent33—that is, even the biggest 
accumulations by standalone funds fall short of 20 percent. 
 2. Wolf packs  
 Of course, even if standalone hedge funds almost never approach 20 percent, any threat 
still is magnified due to their tendency to attack in groups of two and three.  Hedge fund wolf 
packs operate in the absence of formal agreements among their members because formal 
agreement means a securities law “group” and enhances filing requirements.34  Informal group 
activity nonetheless suffices for Unocal purposes—appropriately so, for consciously parallel 
courses of action are there for all to see.   
 There remains a question regarding the size and prevalence of group activity.  The first 
sustained study, from Becht, Franks, Grant, and Wagner, appeared only recently.35  Looking at 
1362 engagements, they find that 78.3 percent involve a standalone fund and 21.7 percent 
involve a wolf pack.  Considering each target separately, they find that 88.2 percent faced a 
standalone fund while 11.8 percent faced a wolf pack.36  The mean wolf pack stockholding is 
13.4 percent compared with 8.3 percent for a standalone fund. 37 Group action does enhance 
influence.  Given a wolf pack, the target’s stock price rises 14 percent during the during the 
window period surrounding the activist’s disclosure of its position compared with 6 percent for a 
                                                          
32 Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Performance, 63 J. Fin. 1729,  1747 (2008). 
33 Nikolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model 47 working 
paper August 2012, available at www.ssrn.comabs=16464712012. 
34 Section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that “[w]hen two or more persons act as a . . . 
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be 
deemed a ‘person’ for the purposes of this subsection.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (2012).  The leading case finding a 
group is CSX Corp. v. Children's Inv. Fund Mgmt., (UK), LLP, 562 F. Supp. 2d 511, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).   
35 Marco Becht, Julian Franks, Jeremey Grant, & Hannes Wagner, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An 
International Study March 2015, working paper available at www.ssrn.com/abs=2376271. 
36 Id. at 51. 
37 Id. at 32. 
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standalone fund.38   The probability of success is 78 percent with a wolf pack and 46 percent for 
an activist alone.39 
The foregoing figures presuppose disclosure by each wolf pack member.  But there also 
are silent fellow travelers who pile in when the lead fund discloses its holding but stay  below the 
5 percent reporting threshold.  A recent study looks at share turnover at the time of lead fund 
disclosure and finds that trading volume is 325 percent above normal levels and then then infers 
that 250 percent of the activity can be attributed to buyers other than the lead.40  The study 
characterizes engagements in the top turnover quartile as wolf pack engagements and finds a 6 
percent higher rate of success and a 9 percent higher rate of board seat acquisition for the 
subset.41 
Wolf pack presence has been taken as the fact that validates a creeping control 
characterization of activism.42  But what we see in fact is enhanced influence without control.  
Wolf packs matter because votes matter, and the objective continues to be minority board 
representation.  While wolf pack formation makes victory more likely, it does not on average 
virtually assure the activist of success by trivializing the number of additional supporting shares 
needing to be solicited.43  Given a mean holding of 13.4 percent, success still requires the 
support of a substantial number of passive shareholders, even assuming the presence of 
undisclosed fellow travelers.    
B. Mergers 
Technically, a creeping control acquisition entails the accumulation and use of a control 
block with little or no sharing of the benefits of control with the non-controlling shareholders.44    
There are a number of scenarios.  A creeping controller can use its accumulated votes to take 
control of the board and then run the company, taking for itself the offices, compensation, and 
other spoils.  To complete the game of exclusion, it can use its control power to cash out the 
                                                          
38 Id. at 5. 
39 Id. at 5. 
40 Yu Ting Forester Wong, Wolves at the Door: A Closer Look at Hedge Fund Activism 3, working paper January 
2016 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2721413. 
41 Id. at 7. 
42 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate 
Governance, 41 J. Corp. L. 545, 593  (2016). 
43 Id. at 562-68. 
44 Id. at 593. 
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minority in a later merger.45  Alternatively, once in power, it can sell its control block to a third 
party, pocketing a premium price.46    
None of these scenarios figures into the working picture of activism.  The closest one gets 
is a case where an activist (or wolf pack) with a relatively large block successfully pushes a sale 
of the target to a third party.   Any abuse lies in the activist’s acquisition of shares prior to 
disclosing its own presence in a public filing.  It thereby accumulates the block at a market price 
unreflective of the coming control transfer, in effect converting the later premium from the 
market sellers.   Two questions follow.  First, whether the scenario occurs frequently, and, 
second, whether it is accurate to characterize it as wrongful conversion.   
There is no question that activism prompts mergers.  But different studies yield different 
figures.   At the low end, Brav, Jiang, and Kim report in 12.2 percent of the cases in their 
database.47  At the high end, Greenwood and Schor come in at 23 percent. 48  Becht, Franks, 
Grant, and Wagner fall between at 18.76 percent.49  The largest and most recent study, from 
Boyson, Gantchev, and Shivdasani,50 tends toward the high end. It shows a takeover bid 
occurring in 24 percent of the engagements—from third parties in 19.9 percent and from the 
activist itself in 3.4 percent.51  A third party bid is 5 times more likely to occur at an activist 
target than at a nontarget firm.52   If the particular activist is categorized as aggressive, the 
probability of a bid is 29.0 percent; if the activist is categorized as experienced in causing 
mergers, the probability rises to 36.4 percent. 53 A bid also means significantly higher stock price 
                                                          
45 Here fiduciary scrutiny minimizes the opportunity for unilaterally imposing a low price.  See Weinberger v. UOP, 
Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
46 This was at one time the central problem of corporate fiduciary law.  The leading case was Perlman v. Feldmann, 
219 F.2d 173, cert. denied 349 U.S. 952 (1955).  For the leading critique, see William D. Andrews, The 
Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 515-22 (1965).  The flow of 
case law has trailed off.  
47Alon Brav, Wei Jiang & Hyunseob Kim, Hedge Fund Activism: A Review 16, working paper February 2010, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1551953.  Also at the low end are Bebchuk, Brav, and  Jiang who report that 
the rate of attrition due to merger for all public companies across a five year period is 42 percent compared to 49 
percent for their sample of activist targets.  See Lucian A, Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term 
Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1104  (2015). 
48 Robin Greenwood & Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 92, 364, 368 (2009). 
49 Becht, Franks, Grant & Wagner, supra note 35, at 54. 
50 Nicole M. Boyson, Nickolay Gantchev & Anil Shivdasani, Activism Mergers, working paper February 2016, 
available at  
51 Id. at 34. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 16. 
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returns from the engagement, with third party bids offering larger premiums than those from 
activists.54  Significantly, the stock price gain is shared pro rata. 
The “victims” are those who sell to activist and wolf pack followers before and at the 
time the lead activist crosses the 5 percent reporting threshold.   It appears that these sellers are 
noise-trading institutions making liquidity trades.55  The sales are uncoerced and result from 
independent business decisions, often portfolio related. There is no loss, only an opportunity 
cost.   Given widespread shareholder diversification, this opportunity cost is in the long run 
matched by a gain on a held investment in a different hedge fund target.   There is no cognizable 
injury. 
C. Summary 
There is a serious problem of fit between classic creeping control picture of shareholder 
victimization and the ordinary incidents of activist intervention.  Hedge funds almost never take 
control.  Although intervention frequently results in a sale of control, the sale holds out a 
considerable upside for the target’s other shareholders.  The gains from sale are shared with the 
group as whole. And, of course, there is no sale in 76 percent (or more) of the cases.  Any 
concerns respecting the premium paid when the activist itself bids can be dealt with under the 
separate line of fiduciary cases that begins with Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc.56  Unocal, in short, is being applied to sustain management defense against activist 
campaigns on a questionable basis that awkwardly cabins twenty-first century hostile 
intervention in a twentieth century mold. 
 
III.  UNOCAL AND ACTIVISM RECONSIDERED 
This Part conducts a ground up reconsideration of Unocal threats in the context of activist 
intervention.  It suggests that the Sotheby’s Court’s “disproportionate influence” notion can be 
amplified so as to fit the circumstances.  The analysis takes corporate law into new territory.  As 
                                                          
54 The 24 month cumulative average returns work out as follows: targets in general 9.8 percent; third party bid 38.9 
percent; activist bid 18.4 percent; failed bid 17.7 percent. Id. at 19-24. 
55 Nickolay Gantchev & Chotibhak Jotikasthira, Institutional Trading and Hedge Fund Activism 3 working paper 
November 2015 available at ssrn.com/abstract=2139482. 
56 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
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restated, Unocal protects shareholder minorities from the business judgments of apparently 
unconflicted shareholder majorities, a reversal of the inherited conceptual framework. 
A.  The State of Play 
The Sotheby’s case stretches existing Unocal caselaw close to the breaking point.  The 
court, once creeping control was off the table, was forced to improvise, formulating two new 
threats—negative control and disproportionate influence—in order to sustain the board’s refusal 
to waive the pill.57  The new threats hold out considerably less in the way of shareholder injury 
than would a genuine creeping control acquisition.  The Court made no attempt to warrant them 
otherwise, implying that low-threshold pills could be vulnerable under Unocal depending on a 
future case’s particular facts.  Meanwhile, there are companies are implementing 10 and 15 
percent standing pills that tend to include language calculated to pick up wolf pack formation—
the pills apply to persons “acting in concert” or in “conscious parallelism” with a lead hedge 
fund.58  Absent a lead activist with a clear creeping control profile like that of Third Point, these 
pills easily could fail inspection under a narrow reading of the Sotheby’s opinion. 
 Thus does the poison pill drafter’s holy grail, a 5 percent standing pill drafted for general 
application, seem unreachable.  Coffee and Palia sensibly opine such a pill carries a cognizable 
risk of peremptory invalidation as “preclusive” within Unocal.59  They nonetheless experiment 
with a justificatory strategy, positing a jump shift to a justification grounded in a public reporting 
benefit rather than in a threat to the target’s business.  They offer a 5.1 percent standing pill that 
would be triggered only if the purchaser failed to file a form 13D before purchasing stock in 
excess of the threshold.60  That is, the activist could exceed a 5 percent holding only by making 
an immediate SEC filing upon reaching 5 percent and surrendering the option to continue to take 
advantage of rule 13d-1’s 10-day filing window to make further unreported stock purchases.61 
As a further modification designed to diminish the chance of invalidation, they suggest that this 
“window-closing pill” allow further acquisitions up to a 15 percent or 20 percent threshold in the 
                                                          
57 It is noted that influence can be found as a factor in Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 
348 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d 5 A.3d 2318 (Del. 2011). 
58 Coffee & Palia, supra note 42, at 602. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 The window is set under rule 13d-1 under section 13(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.   Sections 
929R of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010) explicitly authorize the SEC to shorten the filing window. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012). 
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event of timely filing.62  The redirection of the justificatory theory away from traditional threats 
towards the supplementation of the SEC’s block reporting regime and its 10-day filing window 
addresses a perceived policy need.  Many think the SEC itself should shorten the filing period to 
a day or two even as the SEC has remained unresponsive to their suggestions.63  Coffee and 
Palia’s window-closing pill would effect the change by private ordering.  Significantly, Coffee 
and Palia do not appear to think that hedge fund activism otherwise holds out a threat adequate to 
the task of justifying a 5 percent pill, presumably because the holding level is too low to 
implicate control transfer, creeping or otherwise.         
B. Disproportionate Influence as a Unocal Threat 
 Suppose we extended the law of Unocal threats so as to acknowledge a cognizable 
activist threat without regard to prospects for control transfer.  What would such a regime look 
like?  We here project its possible parameters.  So doing facilitates consideration of the policy 
question attending management actions that impede activist campaigns.  If the projected 
justificatory threat rings hollow, management defensive responses should be deemed to be 
presumptively unreasonable under Unocal.    
We begin with the two backstop threats invoked in the Sotheby’s case—negative control 
and disproportionate influence.  In the litigated case, the former did the work of justifying the 
board’s refusal to waive the 10 percent cap, while the latter was mentioned only in passing.  Now 
the roles are reversed.  Negative control, while working better than creeping control in justifying 
defensive moves against activists, still holds out a problem of fit.  Disproportionate influence, in 
contrast, provides a robust basis for reconfiguring Unocal, at least at a descriptive level.     
Negative control amounts to a lightweight version of creeping control.  It similarly looks 
to control-acquisition, positing that hedge fund blocks potentially injure the general shareholder 
population by acquiring holdup power in respect of supermajority votes.  But the theory also 
moves closer to the activist fact pattern, dropping the concern with the value consequences of a 
                                                          
62 Coffee & Palia, supra note 42 at 602. 
63 See Letter from Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz to SEC Sec'y Elizabeth M. Murray (May 7, 2011),  
http://www.sec.gov/rules/petition/201 1/petn4-624.pdf (petitioning the SEC to shorten the ten-day window of the 
Williams Act); see also Adam 0. Emmerich, Theodore N. Mirvis, Edward S. Robinson & William Savitt, Fair 
Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure and the Use and 
Abuse of Shareholder Power, 3 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 135 (2013). 
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full control transfer and looking only toward distortionary effects on exercises of the shareholder 
franchise.  Certainly, holdups by blockholders with selective incentives and private agendas 
conceivably could be a problem at some companies some of the time.64  But, ultimately, there is 
little resonance with activist practice.  Activist impact is not solely a function of the number of 
shares held.  It follows from the support from similarly-minded shareholders, whether or not they 
are activist hedge funds. Unilateral power to effect voting results, whether positively or 
negatively, does not figure into the model.  Furthermore, the model looks to affirmative results. 
Hold ups and side payments respecting matters submitted by management for shareholder 
approval (other than low-price mergers on the sell side and high-price mergers on the buy side) 
simply don’t figure into the program.  
The second threat, disproportionate influence, poses a more open-ended characterization 
of activism.  Here there is no problem of fit.  Disproportionate influence is what hedge fund 
activism is all about.  Activists travel light, avoiding the large investments required for outright 
control purchase, instead buying smaller, more easily disposable blocks.  They then leverage 
their small stakes into revisions of target business plans by soliciting the voting support of other 
shareholders.  If activism poses a threat, this is where it lies—in change effected at the level of 
business policy, whether focused on an asset sale, additional borrowing, a stepped-up dividend, 
share repurchase activity, operating cost reductions, or a sell-side merger—change effected with 
the consent of a majority of the shares outstanding. 
Of course, there is no threat if these activist-induced changes unequivocally add value. 
Empirical studies weigh in favor of the activists at this point, showing on an aggregate basis that 
their appearance causes enduring stock price increases65 without simultaneously negatively 
                                                          
64 For discussion, see Zohar Goshen, Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule?, 70 So. Cal. L. 
Rev. 741, 769-71 (1997). 
65 Activist intervention causes an immediate stock price increase that lasts for at least a year.  The magnitude of the 
bump varies with the study.  See  Brav et al., supra note 32, at 1729 (7 percent to 8 percent),  April Klein & Emanuel 
Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J. Fin. 187, 188 
(2009)(10.2 percent); Chris Clifford, Value Creation or Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists 4-5, 
working paper, April 2008, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=971018 (3.39 percent),  Robin Greenwood & 
Michael Schor, Investor Activism and Takeovers, 92 J. Fin. Econ. 362, 366-68 (2009)(3.5 percent); Lucian A, 
Bebchuk, et. al., supra note 47 at 1122 (6 percent).   Some of the studies show that positive cumulative abnormal 
returns continue to rise during the period following the activists’ first appearance.  See Greenwood & Schor, supra at 
366-68 (an additional 6.5% over 18 months); Klein & Zur, supra, at 188 (an additional 11.4% over one year).    
18 
 
impacting operating metrics in the long run.66  But a threat characterization still can lie if we 
disaggregate target shareholders into two interest groups.  Following the financial economics,67 
we distinguish those with short-term time horizons who take the full benefit of the stock price 
bump from those with long-term time horizons.  The long-termers’ interests are impaired to the 
extent that activist-induced change chokes off investment activity that would eventually enhance 
returns on the target’s stock.  Such value impairment is a distinct possibility at some companies 
some of the time, being more likely at twenty-first century businesses that invest heavily in ideas 
and relationships and less likely at twentieth-century brick and mortar producers.68  But long-
term value sacrifice will not invariably result from activist victory, and, as noted, the present 
body of empirical studies shows no harm on an aggregate basis.    
The company-specific threat amounts to a twenty-first century recreation of the 
substantive coercion line of Unocal doctrine.  Substantive coercion is the threat held out by a 
procedurally uncoercive tender offer that holds out a substantial premium over the market price 
but nevertheless arguably sacrifices greater long-term value held out by the incumbents’ business 
plan.69  Like the threat being posed here, it divides the shareholders into short- and long-term 
constituencies and allows management to intervene defensively in the name of the latter group.  
There is a significant point of distinction, despite the parallel.  Although Unocal allows 
management to deploy a poison pill so as to block a premium tender offer, it ultimately only 
delays a persistent challenger.  The challenger can leave the offer on the table while conducting a 
proxy contest to gain control of the board with a view to withdrawing the pill and completing the 
acquisition.  Unocal evolved on the theory that the shareholders still got a choice on control 
                                                          
66 The study of operations that takes the longest view comes from Bechuk, Brav, and Jiang, who purport to confirm 
that activist intervention adds long-term value.  They run five-year post-engagement ROA and Tobin’s Q figures for 
a set of engagements from 1994 to 2007.  Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, supra note 47, at 1105. 
67 See, e.g., Francois Brochet, et al., Short-Termism, Investor Clientele, and Corporate Performance 2, working 
paper  Nov. 2013 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999484. 
68 See, e.g.,  See Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee Satisfaction and Equity 
Prices, 101 J. Fin. Econ. 621, 622 (2011)(using appearance on the annual list of 100 Best Companies to Work for in 
America has a proxy for employee satisfaction); Francois Brochet, Maria Loumioti & George Serafeim, Short-
termism, Investor Clientele, and Corporate Performance, working paper Nov. 2013 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999484 (sorting companies between short and long term oriented by coding language used 
by senior managers and investors during quarterly conference calls);  Jillian Popadak, A Corporate Culture Channel: 
How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value, working paper Mar. 2014 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2345384 (quantifying corporate culture through textual analysis of a data set of over 1.8 
million employee reviews). 
69 See Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
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transfer through the exercise of their franchise.  The implicit shareholder-protective justification 
was that the shift from the market for shares to the franchise and the resulting delay gave the 
competing parties time to lay out their cases and the shareholders a low-coercion context in 
which to evaluate the merits of the transaction.  Any chilling effect on hostile takeover activity 
was disregarded, and, arguably, the shareholder interest has not been injured thereby in the long 
run.   
The new application of substantive coercion doctrine suggested here shifts the venue to 
that self-same shareholders’ meeting.  It thereby steps outside of the received justificatory 
framework, which assumes that exercises of the shareholder franchise respecting board 
composition absolutely determine matters of business policy, even at the sacrifice of long-term 
value.  The step is radical, for it disavows systemic reliance on indirect expression of shareholder 
business preferences in connection with director elections.     
Here is a possible justification for the move.  The situation can be described as a 
majority-minority shareholder conflict of interest: a long-term oriented shareholder minority is 
being disadvantaged at the hands of a short-termist shareholder majority, which majority, due the 
parochial, skewed interests of agents of shareholder intermediaries, prefers a low-value short-
term revision of the business plan to a superior long-term value strategy.   The majority-minority 
phrasing is conceptually comforting.  But it still camouflages an implicit judgment that 
shareholder majorities cannot be trusted to determine business planning, even indirectly through 
the exercise of the board franchise.  So let us color the picture of abuse a bit more intensely, re-
characterizing the situation as one in which a short-termist minority exploits a long-termist 
majority.  We get from here to there by disregarding the activists’ shareholdings on the ground of 
interest in the outcome of the vote, analogizing to the majority-of-the-minority shareholder votes 
used to ratify self-dealing transactions between companies and large shareholders.   
The new characterization imports more comfort, but still breaks with the inherited 
conceptual framework, for we are not strictly-speaking talking here about shareholder ratification 
of a self-dealing transaction.  Indeed, there is no self-dealing in the fact pattern, even as there is 
pervasive self-interest.  So far as concerns the duty of loyalty, the activist is no more interested in 
the outcome of the vote than are the defending board members, and the short-termist 
shareholders voting in favor of the activist are no more self-interested than are the long-termist 
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shareholders supporting the board.  The difference between the two shareholder groups is a mere 
incident of their holding periods.  Furthermore, corporate law has always been comfortable with 
the notion that self-interest motivates shareholder voting—there is no shareholder-level duty to 
vote with a view to the corporation’s best interests.70    
The theory described is hypothetical.  Even so, markers pointed in its direction are being 
put down in Delaware cases.  Consider the following from Vice-Chancellor Travis Laster’s 
opinion in case about a trade sale of a venture capital startup, In re Trados Inc. Shareholder 
Litigation71:  
A Delaware corporation, by default, has a perpetual existence.  Equity capital, by default, 
is permanent capital. In terms of the standard of conduct, the duty of loyalty therefore 
mandates that directors maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the 
benefit of the providers of equity capital, as warranted for an entity with perpetual life in 
which the residual claimants have locked in their investment.  When deciding whether to 
pursue a strategic alternative that would end or fundamentally alter the stockholders' 
ongoing investment in the corporation, the loyalty-based standard of conduct requires that 
the alternative yield value exceeding what the corporation otherwise would generate for 
stockholders over the long-term.  Value, of course, does not just mean cash. It could 
mean an ownership interest in an entity, a package of other securities, or some 
combination, with or without cash, that will deliver greater value over the anticipated 
investment horizon.   The duty to act for the ultimate benefit of stockholders does not 
require that directors fulfill the wishes of a particular subset of the stockholder base. . . . . 
Stockholders may have idiosyncratic reasons for preferring decisions that misallocate 
capital. Directors must exercise their independent fiduciary judgment; they need not cater 
to stockholder whim.72 
Vice-Chancellor Laster makes an important move with this purposive alignment of corporate 
law’s basic framework with the long-term side of the conflict between short- and long-term time 
                                                          
70 The only exception covers vote buying.  See Goshen, supra note 64, at 789.  For the suggestion that a fiduciary 
duty should apply, see Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 
1255 (2008). 
71 73 A.3d 17 (2013). 
72 Id. at 37-38. 
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horizons.  Historically, such basic conceptual statements have elided the short-term/long-term 
distinction, treating the shareholder interest in unitary terms.73  Vice-Chancellor Laster’s 
formulation, which was quite unnecessary to the decision of the case, normatively situates 
corporate law firmly on the long-term side.  As such, it builds a normative justification for 
management actions against disproportionately influential activists into corporate law’s 
conceptual framework. Indeed, if the formulation was deployed foursquare in a litigated case, it 
would obviate any need to invoke the foregoing majority-minority characterization. The case 
becomes easy: to the extent that the core legal concept of the corporation includes a bias toward 
a long-term time horizon, there is no need to make reference to incentive impairments on the 
shareholders’ part.  Long-termism standing alone would suffice as a justification.   
There remains a substantial question as to whether we can ever expect to see Vice-
Chancellor Laster’s statement deployed on the facts of a case so as to trump the conceptual 
framework’s protection of shareholder voting discretion in board elections.  But, for what is it 
worth, the statement is now embedded in the caselaw in neutral form, ready to be invoked to 
justify a 5 percent poison pill.       
 
IV. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES 
We have posited a justification for a 5 percent general purpose poison pill, remodeling 
corporate law’s conceptual framework to characterize activist employment of the shareholder 
franchise as a threat.  It now must be noted that even if the law were to follow the course charted, 
it probably would not make much practical difference.  Therein lies a hidden justification for the 
change suggested.   
A. Standing Pills and Grandfathered Shares 
Standing poison pills are disappearing, even as the level of activism continues to increase 
slightly, year by year.  The reason is that managers now cater to the concerns of institutional 
investors and their informational intermediaries, all of whom dislike poison pills.  In 2005, 35 
                                                          
73 See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §2.01 
(1994). 
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percent of public companies had a poison pill in place.  As of 2012, only 805 companies had 
standing pills, amounting to 22.6 percent of publicly-traded companies.  Ten percent of those 
pills were triggered at less than 15 percent, 61 percent were triggered at 15 percent and 15 
percent were triggered at more than 15 percent.74    By 2015 there were only 471 companies with 
a standing pill—12.7 percent of public companies—of which only 25 were two-tier, low 
threshold pills of type seen in Sotheby’s.75    
It follows that, like the board in Sotheby’s, defending managers adopt pills only once 
activists materialize with rule 13d-1 filings or pre-filing complaints and demands.   These 
delayed pills have no effect on purchases in advance of promulgation (at least so long as 
selective ex post dilution of shareholder interests is impossible under corporate (and maybe 
property) law).   
The delay substantially diminishes the pill’s potency, for grandfathered activist purchases 
tend to be sufficient to support a serious challenge.  Given the 10-day filing window under rule 
13d-1, the vast majority of purchases by the lead activist and any wolf pack members already 
have been made in advance of the filing of a form 13D and pill deployment.  In fact, challengers 
do not even need the 10 days of breathing space held out by the rule.  In practice, market 
purchases above the 5 percent threshold are disproportionately concentrated on the day the 
threshold is crossed and the day following.76  It seems that even undisclosed wolf pack members 
have their blocks in place by the second day.77 Given this purchase pattern, a reduction of the 
13d-1 filing window to even one day might have little practical deterrent effect.   
A standing 5 percent pill has more bite, for it is triggered by purchases above 5 percent 
irrespective of the timing of a 13d-1 filing.  Indeed, at present this is the only defense providing 
ex ante protection against activist intervention.  But the deterrent effect is only marginal.  A five 
percent per fund cap contains the intervention’s impact by limiting the number of safe votes and 
giving a defensive proxy solicitation a higher probability of success.  Perhaps more importantly, 
                                                          
74 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav,  Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Wei Jiang, Pre-Disclosure Accumulations by 
Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. Corp. L  1, 26-27 (2013). 
75 Coffee & Palia, supra note 42, at 30 n. 67.  The percentage figure assumes 3700 publicly-traded companies in 
2015. See Barry Ritholtz, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone? June 24 2015 available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-06-24/where-have-all-the-publicly-traded-companies-gone-. 
76 See Bebchuk, et. al., supra note 74, at 23-25.   
77 See Wong, supra note 40. 
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it also limits the arbitrage profit yielded on pre-announcement share purchases by the post-
announcement price bump.  But it does not necessarily tip the cost-benefit scale against 
intervention. 
A pill with something approaching preclusive effect would take a bit more.  The drafter 
would have to sweep all wolf pack members into a defined group and then cap the group at 5 
percent.78  Problems of verification probably would limit such a provision’s effectiveness, for the 
cap changes the activists’ cost-benefit calculations concerning public disclosure.  If every wolf in 
the pack held less than 5 percent, federal filing would no longer be required (at least so long as 
the federal group definition rules were not traversed79).  The lead hedge fund presumably would 
disclose itself anyway, as an inevitable incident of the campaign.   Any others could remain 
undisclosed, disabling the target from proving their participation and hence from enforcing its 5 
percent group pill.  A benefit still follows for the target, for, given undisclosed fellow travelers, 
the lead fund’s clout would be more a matter of speculation than it is with a large disclosed wolf 
pack.  But there would be no guarantee that any hedge funds working in parallel were in fact 
limited to an aggregate 5 percent.  
B.  Policy Considerations 
Let us now take a step back and ask whether a Unocal regime that accepted a 5 percent 
standing pill (with or without a provision extending to groups) would be a bad thing. 
1. The Case Against. 
The potential downsides of the regime posited are clear to all—advocates of shareholder 
empowerment have set them out at length.  For them, hedge fund activism is an unadulterated 
good and any increase in management insulation adds to agency costs.80  And even if the 
shareholder advocates’ absolute claims are unsustainable—there are costs and benefits on both 
                                                          
78 For drafting strategies, see Coffee & Palia, supra note 42, at 601-602. 
79 Rule 13d–5, promulgated under § 13 of the Exchange Act, provides: 
When two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing 
of equity securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial 
ownership, for purposes of Section 13(d) and (g) of the Act, as of the date of such agreement, of all equity 
securities of that issuer beneficially owned by any such persons. 
80 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1637 
(2013); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68 Bus. Law.  9789 
(2013).   
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sides after all—the policy bottom line still resonates strongly.  On aggregate, hedge fund 
activism may very well do some good and has not been shown to do affirmative harm.   
Corporate law has accommodated it more or less without change.  No change has been required, 
for activists work within the law’s inherited framework, operating within the confines of board-
centric governance.  They effect changes in business plans by joining boards in a minority 
posture, not by displacing incumbents wholesale.  Their opponents so far have not managed to 
prompt any disabling reform.  Given all of this, a root-and-branch revision of corporate law that 
makes it much more difficult for activists to join boards of directors needs to be justified by a 
showing of systemic damage to business plans and productivity. Arguably, no such showing can 
be made on the present record.   It follows that we should adhere to the regulatory status quo. 
From this point of view, most of the questions considered in Sotheby’s in connection with 
a two-tier 10 percent standing pill never should have come up in the first place.  Instead, the 10 
percent trigger should been deemed invalid absent a compelling justification—Blasius rather 
than Unocal review.  In this reframing of the law, the traditional 20 percent trigger becomes a 
line drawn in the sand, with the party seeking to step over it with a lower threshold bearing a 
heavy policy burden to discredit activism.  The argument is powerful, for, as we have seen, 
creeping control and negative control, the theories thus far deployed to this end of sanctioning 
low threshold pills, largely fail to grapple with the matters at hand and so import little policy 
traction against an argument favoring the twenty percent status quo.   
2. A Case in Favor.   
Let us now attempt to justify a 5 percent poison pill in the teeth of the foregoing 
argument.  The going is rough, for there is no aggregate evidence of injury from activism to 
support a policy case for across-the-board legal deterrence.  Any case must be company-specific.  
To make such a case persuasively, one would have to avoid traditional Unocal factors, which 
tend to be beside the point.  One instead would concentrate on the particular company’s business 
plan, showing a capital-intensive investment program and a need to insulate long-term 
relationships with employees, customers, and suppliers from disruption.  The case is more easily 
stated in theory than in practice, for its central empirical elements resist easy verification, even 
on a company-by-company basis.   At the same time, the incentives of any managers making 
such a case are highly suspect.   
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Hypothesize a company whose managers can make an excellent case in all sincerity.  
Nothing would prevent them from submitting their pill to their shareholders for ratification, 
using the case to support the motion.  Given shareholder approval and a pill of limited duration, 
say, no more than five years, fiduciary law arguably would hold out no basis for challenge.  
Shareholder approval simultaneously launders away any implication of management 
entrenchment and confirms the presence of a cognizable threat.   
The scenario just posed holds out cold comfort to real world managers operating under 
uncertainty.  Shareholders dislike pills, and would be disinclined to take seriously even a valid 
case.  Sincerity is unverifiable and any management representations would be discounted for 
good reason.  Even a case that remained persuasive net of a credibility discount still probably 
would fail.  The institutional intermediaries who decide these questions are self-interested 
themselves and have a vested interest their own empowerment.  Any discourse posing situational 
benefits from enhanced management insulation threatens their power structure by traversing the 
widely-held assumption that insulation is never cost beneficial due to stepped up agency costs.   
Meanwhile, the very attempt to make the case in the context of a proxy solicitation to approve a 
poison pill holds out risks for management.  A failed solicitation sends a signal of vulnerability 
even as the case itself reveals information of interest to a potential activist.  It comes as no 
surprise that such solicitations are not seen in practice. 
We could stop here, leaving management with the burden of persuading its shareholders 
as a condition to justifying an effective deterrent pill.  But let’s give it one more try, shifting the 
burden over to the shareholders on a penalty default theory.  We leave the managers free to 
promulgate a 5 percent pill unilaterally in the absence of searching Unocal scrutiny, remitting the 
job of punishing the managers to their disgruntled institutional shareholders rather than to the 
courts.   
This defensive shift in the structure that sets the balance of power between shareholders 
and managers could prove beneficial in the long run.  The positive projection relies on the 
assumption that standing pills—even 5 percent pills without risk of Unocal invalidation—are 
very unlikely to be seen in practice because managers now cater to shareholder preferences.  A 
management promulgating such a pill would have a lot of explaining to do, even absent the 
burden of conducting a successful proxy solicitation.  Let us once again posit that the 
26 
 
promulgating company is unsuitable for activist targeting, and that management can make an 
excellent case by reference to the company’s investment policy and relational commitments.   
Management promulgates the pill, simultaneously making the explanation.  A set-to with ISS, 
Glass Lewis, and the large institutions no doubt would follow.  The resulting dialogue could be 
beneficial—a learning experience for the institutional investor community.   
Spinning the scenario out a bit, the poison pill emerges as a lever facilitating a productive 
sorting of companies among those well-suited and ill-suited to activist discipline, a sorting that 
will not occur under the present regime of Unocal scrutiny because managers have good reasons 
to avoid seeking shareholder ratification.  It would achieve what anti-activist reformers tried and 
failed to get from the SEC—an activist baffler that deters purchases above 5 percent.  It would be 
a superior means to the end because it would be a product of private ordering and would operate 
company by company.   
The positive projection follows from the assumption that shareholder empowerment has 
waxed to the point at which most managers, even managers who believe in their own case, will 
refrain taking advantage of available defenses in order to avoid retaliation from the intermediary 
community.  If the assumption is unsound and a green light prompted a massive turn to standing 
pills, without a beneficial informational back-and-forth, then the projection is unsound.    
The projection’s plausibility is remitted to the reader’s judgment. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 This chapter posed the question whether Unocal, a twentieth century doctrine keyed to 
hostile takeovers and control transfers, appropriately can be applied in a twenty-first century 
governance context in which the challenger limits itself to the shareholder franchise and does not 
seek control.  The answer clearly is no.  The doctrine fixes on the wrong threat.  It likely will 
retain this refractory framing even so.  There is no emergency—the Sotheby’s ruling does next to 
nothing to crimp the strategies that determine most activist campaigns even as it strikes a blow 
for the defensive side.  Unocal would have to be revamped conceptually in order to align itself 
with the right threat and so sustain a poison pill with enough bite even to begin to deter activism.  
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A reformulation would have such radical implications for corporate law’s conceptual framework 
as to open it to widespread and severe questioning.  But the context is changing.  Shareholder 
power has waxed sufficiently to make it plausible to contemplate the renovation.  Management 
agency costs just aren’t as big a deal as they used to be. 
 
 
 
 
